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JOINT REGULATION OF SINGLE STOCK
FUTURES: CAUSE OR RESULT OF REGULATORY
ARBITRAGE AND INTERAGENCY TURF WARS?
David B. Esau'
In an increasingly global marketplace, there are growing concerns that
the U.S. financial markets are not keeping competitive pace with
innovation in investment products.' Congress responded to these
concerns by passing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
(CFMA) in December 2000,2 effectively repealing the Shad-Johnson
Jurisdictional Accord of 1982 (Shad-Johnson).3
Shad-Johnson prohibited futures contracts4 on individual stocks and
narrow-based stock indexes5 (collectively referred to as "security
futures," "security futures products," or "single-stock futures"). The
CFMA, in contrast, provides a regulatory framework that permits trading
in security futures by granting jurisdiction to both the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFFC) and the Securities & Exchange
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2003, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law.
1. See The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Hearing on H.R. 4541
Before the House Comm on Banking and Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. 125 (2000) (statement of
Mark D. Young, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
2. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., & 15
U.S.C.) (all cites to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) are to the bill
section numbers).
3. The Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (Oct.
13, 1982) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), was the result of an agreement
between the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's Chairman, Phil Johnson, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission's Chairman, John Shad, to clarify jurisdictional
concerns between the two agencies and their respective products. See U.S. General
Accounting Office Report to Congressional Requesters, Issues Related to the Shad-
Johnson Jurisdictional Accord (Apr. 2000).
4. A futures contract is an "agreement that obligate[s] the holder to buy or sell a
specific amount or value of an underlying asset, reference rate, or index at a specified
price on a specified date." GAO Report, supra note 3, at 1 n.2.
5. The term "narrow-based stock index" has had several definitions. Generally, a
"narrow-based" stock index is an index comprised of nine or fewer securities, or an index
with one or more component securities comprising a certain percentage of the index's
weighting. See CFMA § 201 (5)(B)(2000). Interpretation of the definition of a "narrow
based stock index" was published pursuant to the CFMA, at 66 Fed. Reg. 44,490-516
(Aug. 23, 2001).
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Commission (SEC).6 The CFMA also mandates a timeframe for the two
agencies to establish trading rules for such products.7
In examining the introduction of single-stock futures and narrow-based
stock index futures to the financial world, this Comment focuses on the
relationship between the CFTC and the SEC after the passage of the
CFMA. This Comment examines the future popularity and regulation of
security futures through analysis of the Shad-Johnson Accord, followed
by a detailed look at the CFMA. This Comment then analyzes the
jurisdictional concerns associated with security futures trading8 between
the CFTC, which regulates futures contracts, and the SEC, which
regulates securities. This Comment considers the rules promulgated by
the two agencies relating to registration requirements, margin level
differences, suitability standards, best execution methods, tax
implications, and antifraud provisions. The Comment concludes with
two predictions: (1) security futures will not be overwhelmingly popular,
and (2) joint regulation compounds the problems rather than solves
them.
I. AN EXAMINATION OF THE HISTORY BEHIND SECURITY FUTURES
A. An Examination of the Problem: The Shad-Johnson
Jurisdictional Accord of 1982
A futures contract is an obligation to buy or sell a specified quantity of
an underlying asset at a specified price at a specified time in the future. 9
The CFTC has jurisdiction over futures contracts.0 The Commodity
6. See, e.g., CFMA §§ 202, 251 (2000).
7. See CFMA § 202(a)(5) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(g)(5)(1994)). The CFMA
required the SEC and CFTC to implement rules by August 21, 2001, for institutional
investors and December 21, 2001, for retail investors. Id.; see also 66 Fed. Reg. 44,490 n.5
(Aug. 23,2001).
8. Although widely accepted, the term "trading" in the context of futures contracts
is not technically accurate. Each futures contract is an entity of its own and may be bought
or sold. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Glenn Willett Clark,
Genealogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future Delivery" in the
Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1176 (1978)). A customer wishing to
liquidate his assets on a futures transaction, technically takes an opposite position on an
identical, though separate, contract, thereby effectively canceling out, or offsetting, his
initial transaction. See id.
9. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, GLOSSARY OF FUTURES TERMS 13 (1995).
10. See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2000). The CFTC has
jurisdiction over futures contracts on, inter alia, agricultural and other tangible
commodities, treasury bills, foreign currency, and broad-based stock index futures, as well
as options on those products. 7 U.S.C. § 1-27 (2000). The CFTC does not, however, have
jurisdiction over options on individual stocks. The SEC maintains that authority pursuant
[Vol. 51:917
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Exchange Act (CEA), enacted during the New Deal in 1936, provides
the statutory structure for regulating futures contracts. The CEA was
passed in response to a growing concern regarding manipulation in the
commodities market.12  Ultimately, the CEA was enacted to protect
against wild market speculation 3 and to shield farmers and the
agricultural community from market manipulators. 4
The federal securities laws are also a product of New Deal legislation.5
In the four years following the 1929 stock market crash, the value of the
securities markets was slashed nearly in half. 6 Much of this loss is
attributable to fraudulent securities schemes." As a result, the decision
was made to create a regulatory framework focusing on information
disclosure.' Enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 9 which
mandated such disclosure on securities being brought to market, was the
first step in this process.2O
to the Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord. Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (Oct. 12,
1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (2000).
12. S. REP. No. 1431, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935) (stating that the legislation was
aimed at remedying "trade practices involving the cheating of customers").
13. The legislative history of the CEA implies that many senators viewed speculation
in the commodities market as an activity akin to "gambling." See, e.g., 62 CONG. REC.
9,404 (June 26, 1922) (remarks of Chairman Tincher, House Committee on Agriculture).
Tincher stated: "I have never said that the sale of wheat for future delivery should be
entirely wiped out ... but have always said, and I still say, that to let a few gamblers
manipulate the grain market was not only unfair to the consumer, but unfair to the
legitimate trade." Id.; see also id. at 9,412. Congress' intent was to protect the
unsophisticated investor against wild speculation and to prohibit fraud. Id. In 1928, the
Department of Agriculture determined that federal statutory authority was needed to
"insure fair dealing, and to prevent fraudulent practices .... " Hearings on H.R. 11,952
Before the House Comm. on Agric., 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1928) (statement of Mr. J.W.T.
Duvel, Chief, Grain Futures Administration, Department of Agriculture). Legislation was
eventually passed to "protect the rights of customers as fully as possible." H.R. REP. No.
1551, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
14. Farmers have historically used futures contracts on commodities to hedge against
price risk and ensure stability in their pricing powers. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283,
287-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Abelardo Valdez, Modernizing the Regulation of the
Commodity Futures Markets, 13 HARV. J. LEGiS. 35, 40 (1975); see also id. at 293-96.
15. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 6-7 & n.4 (3d
ed. 1996).
16. See id. at 6.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 6-7.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000).
20. See generally James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of
1933,28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
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The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),2' which promised
even broader investor protection, addresses the regulation of stock
exchanges, margin requirements,23 periodic disclosure,24 proxy voting,2
insider trading,26 and prohibition of fraud.27 The 1934 Act also created
the Securities and Exchange Commission, giving it broad powers to
oversee the new federal securities laws.' Both the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act have been amended several times, and other major federal securities
legislation has been subsequently enacted. 29  Despite the various
amendments and subsequent laws, the basic tenets of protecting
investors and maintaining an orderly securities market have remained
unaltered.30
In the mid-1970s, a flurry of innovative financial products resulted in a
drastic transformation of the securities and commodities markets. 1 U.S
investors were inundated with new financial opportunities and more
32instruments with which to invest their money. This wave of activity,
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
22. Id. § 78f.
23. Id. § 78g.
24. Id. §§ 781-78m.
25. Id. § 78n.
26. Id. § 78p.
27. Id. §§ 78i-78j.
2& Id. § 78d.
29. See, e.g., The Investment Company Act of 1940,15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I-80a-64 (2000);
The Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Id. §§ 80b-l-80b-21 (2000).
30. See HAZEN, supra note 15, at 21-25.
31. See Hearing on H.R. 4541, supra note 1, at 43-45 (statement of Mark D. Young,
Partner, Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchnage) (discussing how financial engineers on Wall Street have
changed the landscape of investment products).
32. Id. Such products include, inter alia, swaps, hybrids, options, and security futures.
Swaps, which were created in the late 1980s, are exchanges of one asset or liability for a
similar asset or liability for the purpose of raising or lowering coupon rates to maximize
revenue or minimize financing costs. GLOSSARY, supra note 9, at 26. Hybrids, which also
began trading in the late 1980s, are financial instruments that use equity or debt securities
or depository interests combined with features of either commodity futures or option
contracts or both. Gregory Kuserk, OTC Derivatives Regulation: Options, Swaps, Hybrids
and Energy Contracts, CFFC Summer Intern Training Program Presentation (July 24,
2001)(on file with author). Options contracts, which began trading in the early 1900s, but
were banned in 1.936 and reauthorized in 1974 by the CFTC, are contracts which give the
buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specified quantity of a commodity
at a specific price within a specific time. GLOSSARY, supra note 9, at 20.
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coupled with amendments to the CEA,33 raised new regulatory concerns
for the CFTC the SEC. 4
In the late 1970s, a jurisdictional dispute arose between the CFTC and
the SEC.35 The CFTC granted the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) the
authority to trade futures contracts on Government National Mortgage
Association pass-through mortgage-backed certificates. 6 Both agencies,
however, asserted jurisdiction over these products after the CFTC
granted the power to the CBOT.37 The SEC claimed that the products
were securities, while the CFTC asserted that they were futures
contracts. 3 The debate continued until 1981 when the SEC granted the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) the authority to trade
options contracts on the same mortgage-backed certificates.39 Not
pleased that the CBOE was allowed to trade the certificates, the CBOT
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to
set aside the SEC rules granting authority to the CBOE to trade the
mortgage-backed certificates. ° The court granted CBOT's petition and
held that the CFTC had jurisdiction over the mortgage-backed
certificates.4' Following the decision, the SEC and the CFTC sought
once again to clarify their respective jurisdictions.42 The Shad-Johnson
Accord established jurisdictional boundaries for the CFTC and the SEC
by prohibiting futures contracts on individual stocks and narrow-based
stock indexes. 43 The Accord gave the SEC the authority to regulate
security-based options" and authorized the CFTC to regulate futures
33. See generally GAO Report, supra note 3. In 1974, the CEA was "amended to
expand the definition of a commodity to include virtually anything -- tangible or
intangible. Consequently, a security fell within the definition of a commodity." Id. at 5.
The CEA was also amended to give the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over options on
futures. Id.
34. See id. at 5-6.





40. Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982).
41. Id. at 1159-61.
42. Shad-Johnson Jurisdictional Accord, Pub. L. No. 97-303, 96 Stat. 1409 (Oct. 13,
1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Accord was codified
in the Securities Act Amendments of 1982, which amended the federal securities laws, and
the Futures Trading Act of 1982, which amended the CEA. GAO report, supra note 3, at
5-6.
43. See id. at 6.
44. See id.
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contracts on broad-based 45 stock indexes and individual government
securities.46
The ban on single-stock futures was intended initially to be a
temporary solution until the two agencies could determine an
appropriate regulatory scheme.47 An agreement was never finalized,
however, and the ban remained in effect until the passage of the CFMA
in late December 2000.4'
B. An Examination of the Solution: The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act
There are myriad reasons supporting the investment community's
attempts to seek authorization to trade security futures products.
45. A "broad-based stock index" is any stock index that is not narrow-based. 66 Fed.
Reg. 44,490, 44,491 (Aug. 23, 2001). Under the 1982 Shad-Johnson agreement, the CFTC
was permitted to allow any stock index futures contract to be traded if the CFTC found
that it was: "(1) settled in cash; (2) not readily susceptible to manipulation; and (3)
reflected the market as a whole or a substantial segment of the market." GAO Report,
supra note 3, at 6. After the CFMA was passed in December 2000, and the ban on
security futures was lifted, the term "narrow-based index" was re-defined. 66 Fed. Reg.
44,490, 44,491 (Aug. 23, 2001); see also CFMA § 201 (5)(B).
46. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000); see also Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 676
(11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that an action regarding T-bond futures raises no claim under
federal or state securities laws, but does under the Commodity Exchange Act because the
fundamental congressional design was to avoid duplicative regulation).
47. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 6; see also H.R. REP. No. 97-565, pt.1, at 40 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3889. "The agreement ... [does] not permit the
trading of futures on individual corporate and municipal securities. Both agencies,
however, intend to devote further study to issues in this area with a view toward a
recommendation to lift this restriction." Id.; see also Hearing on H.R. 4541, supra note 1,
at 124 (statement of Mark D. Young, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
48. Technically, the ban on security futures remained in effect until the latter half of
2001. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(g)(5)(West Supp. 2001) (stating that trading security futures is
illegal for one year after the passage of the CFMA); CFMA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and
15 U.S.C.). The CFMA required the SEC and the CFTC to implement a plan by August
21, 2001, for institutional investors and December 21, 2001, for retail investors to begin
trading security futures. CFMA § 202(5)(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(g)(5) (1994)); see also
66 Fed. Reg. 44,490 n.5 (Aug. 23, 2001). Several factors, however, including interagency
battles over final margin rules and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, delayed the
intended launch date until March, 2002. Alex Skorecki, US. Regulatory Hurdles Delay
Life Move: Exchange Chief Hits Out at Unexplained Postponements to Allow Trading in
Single Stock Futures, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 23, 2002, at 3; Daily Briefing, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., Oct. 9,2001, at 2C; see also Commissioner Laura Unger, SEC, Address at the
Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law (Oct. 17, 2001). The trading
delay ultimately extended beyond May of that year and into the second quarter of 2002.
Bill Barnhart, Single-Stock Futures Get Truly Timely, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 19,2002.
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Compelling arguments for passing the CFMA and allowing futures
contracts on single stocks and narrow-based stock indexes include: (1)
the need to stay competitive with other world markets; (2) the need to
codify regulations for an already existing practice; and (3) the need to
account for a changing role for the U.S. futures markets.49
1. Falling Behind the Curve: Competitive World Markets and Innovative
Investment Instruments
To keep pace with a continuously evolving and increasingly global
marketplace, regulators sought means to ensure that the United States
remained a competitive leader in financial products and services. °
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan's congressional
testimony regarding the CFMA indicates concern about the inevitability
of U.S. stock futures trading on foreign markets:"
[T]here's just little question in my judgment that we're not all
that far away from single-stock futures on U.S. stocks trading in
other countries. And if we don't resolve this issue [of how to
regulate security futures] Shad-Johnson will get resolved but
not in a manner which I think would be desirable for any of us.52
Chairman Greenspan predicted that foreign markets would begin
trading futures contracts on U.S. stocks.53 He also predicted that the
foreign markets would directly compete with U.S. financial markets for
business. 4
49. S. 2697 - The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000: Joint Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry and the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 2-3 (2000) (statement of Sen. Richard G.
Lugar, Chairman, Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry).
50. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 4541, supra note 1, at 125 (statement of Mark D.
Young, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago
and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (noting that the "Swiss-German electronic
exchange, called EVREX ... has replaced the Chicago Board of Trade as the futures
exchange with the highest trading volume"); see also Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note
49, at 3 (statement of Sen. Lugar, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and
Forestry). Senator Lugar stated:
The goal of the legislation is to ensure that the United States remains a global
leader in the derivatives marketplace. Already the United States has lost much
of its leadership role in the exchange traded futures markets in Europe ....
Congress has a good opportunity at this point to reverse this tide by enacting
sound legislation.
Id.
51. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 21 (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Federal Reserve Board).
52 Id.
53. See id. at 21-22.
54. Id. at 21.
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Today, Greenspan's concerns have been realized,55 but the U.S. has
been able to address these concerns by lifting the security futures trading
ban.56
Futures contracts on twenty-five "universal" single stocks began
trading in London in January 2001, with an additional 107 listed since
that date.57 Several other foreign exchanges have begun trading these
products as well.58 As a general matter, the market that regulates stocks
in these foreign countries also regulates futures.59  Therefore, no
jurisdictional issues arise as they do under U.S. law. Even though
popularity in these foreign products is low to moderate,6° U.S. regulators
inticipate heavier trading once investors become better acquainted with
the products. 6  Although the CFMA was based partially on the
anticipated popularity of the new products, the primary focus was to
55. As Chairman Greenspan predicted, the London International Financial Futures
and Options Exchange (LIFFE) initiated a program to list several U.S. stock futures on its
London Exchange in September 2000, just two months after his testimony before the U.S.
Senate. See http://www.liffe.com (last visited May 12, 2002). As of May 12, 2002, twenty-
one U.S. stocks traded on LIFFE. See id.
56. Press Release, Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc., LIFFE and Nasdaq Form Partnership
to Offer Single Stock Futures in U.S. and Europe (Mar. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.nasdaqnews.com (last visited Apr 17, 2002). The Nasdaq stock market and
LIFFE announced a partnership in March 2001 to develop a security futures market. Id.
This market will include U.S. stocks. See id. The joint venture between LIFFE and
Nasdaq was scheduled to commence in the U.S., with between fifty and seventy-five
products, as soon as regulatory action permitted trading. Melissa Allison, Ex-CFTC Chief
to Lead Stock Futures Joint Venture, CI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 30, 2001 (discussing a rival to
the Nasdaq/LIFFE venture, a joint venture between the Chicago Board Options
Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
57. See Nasdaq Press Release, supra note 56, at n.2; see also www.liffe.com (last
visited Apr. 17, 2002).
58. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 11. Some of the foreign exchanges that permit
futures contracts on single stocks to be bought and sold include the Budapest Stock
Exchange (Hungary), Bolsa de Derivados do Porto (Portugal), FUTOP Clearing Centre
(Denmark), Helsinki Stock and Derivatives Exchanges (Finland), Hong Kong Futures
Exchange (Hong Kong), Mexican Derivatives Market (Mexico), OM Stockholm
Exchange (Sweden), South Africa Futures Exchange (South Africa), and the Sydney
Futures Exchange (Australia). Id.
59. Id. (noting that "[i]n contrast to the United States... the regulator that oversees
the futures market also oversees the state market")(emphasis added).
60. See Nasdaq Press Release, supra note 56 (describing how popularity of security
futures on LIFFE has been somewhat slow). In 2001, single stock futures enjoyed "limited
success." Single Stock Futures, at http://www.fif.com/SingleStockFutures.asp (last visited
Apr. 17, 2002).
61. Allison, supra note 56 (describing how some see security futures eventually being
successful, but they may not "hit the ground running") (quoting Jon Najarian, Founder,
Mercury Trading).
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remain competitive in providing investors with innovative investment
strategies.62
2. Regulation of an Already Existing Practice
Although the CFMA authorized trading in single-stock futures and
narrow-based stock indexes, these products have been effectively traded
for a number of years through a complex series of options trades, known
as "synthetic security futures., 63  Synthetic security futures avoid
regulation because they allow the trading of security futures
notwithstanding Shad-Johnson, albeit for twice the transactional costs.
64
In order to ensure an accurate and reliable regulatory structure,
Congress passed the CFMA.65 The CFMA eliminates the need for
investors to conduct such complex and expensive transactions by
permitting non-synthetic security futures to be traded.67
3. A New Role for the U.S. Futures Markets
As of the most recent CFTIC annual report, over sixty-five percent of
the average month-end open interest in the U.S. futures markets is based
on underlying financial assets. 68 It is apparent that the U.S. futures
market has changed drastically since the New Deal era, when the
intended purpose of the CEA was to protect the agricultural
62. See Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 22 (statement of Sen. Fitzgerald)
("If we do not repeal Shad-Johnson, we are going to be confronted with foreign nations
that are offering individual stock futures on our American companies.").
63. See GAO Report, supra note 3, at 9-10. The report stated:
Options on single stocks serve similar economic functions as would be served by
futures on single stocks. For example, both products could be used to protect a
stock position from a decline in price, or to speculate on an anticipated price
change in the stock .... [O]ptions on single stocks can be used to replicate
prohibited futures on single stocks. For example, by buying a call option on a
single stock and selling a put option on the same stock, a single stock futures
contract can be created synthetically.
Id. at 9-10. (footnotes omitted).
64. Id. at 10 (noting that "single stock futures could be more efficient and less costly
than synthetic futures because they involve one futures transaction instead of two options
transactions").
65. CFMA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., & 15 U.S.C.).
66. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 9-10. Synthetic security futures involve at least two
transactions, as opposed to just one for the now-permitted security futures. See id. at 10.
67. CFMA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., & 15 U.S.C.).
68. See 2000 CFTC Annual Report 103. Financial assets include foreign currencies,
stock indexes, interest rates, insurance, and now, single stocks and narrow-based stock
indexes. Id. at 124-35.
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commodities markets from fraud and manipulation. 9 To account for this
evolution of markets and to provide for a host of innovative products,
Congress was compelled to modernize the regulatory structure of the
U.S. futures markets. °
II. PRE-EXISTING REGULATORY TENSION BETWEEN FUTURES AND
SECURITIES: How JOINT REGULATION WILL COMPOUND CONFUSION
IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
A. Are Security Futures Securities or Futures?
Congress had several reasons for passing the CFMA and for
introducing single-stock futures and narrow-based stock index futures
into the U.S. financial arena.7 The question that arises, though, is why
Congress thought it was beneficial to appropriate regulation in the
manner it did. The CFMA creates a framework for the CFTC and the
SEC to jointly regulate security futures,72 but fails to provide much
guidance regarding how to accomplish this daunting task. In rushing to
market with a new and potentially unpopular product, Congress took the
quick, but not necessarily most effective, avenue. By prescribing joint
regulation, Congress adopted a structure of regulatory tension and legal
uncertainty in the process."
The CFMA states that security futures should be regulated as both
securities and futures.74 Accordingly, there are situations in which joint
69. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283,294-96 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Hearings on H.R.
11,952, supra note 13, at 7 (statement of Mr. J.W.T. Duvel, Chief, Grain Futures
Administration, Department of Agriculture) (explaining that the purpose of the
legislation was to "insure fair dealing and to prevent fraudulent practices").
70. See Hearing on 4541, supra note 1, at 43-44 (statement of Mark D. Young,
Partner, Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago and the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (discussing how, in the past 15 years, financial engineers on
Wall Street have changed the landscape of financial products).
71. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49 (statement of Sen. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry).
72. See generally, CFMA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21, 2000)
(codified at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., & 15 U.S.C.) (mandating
coordinated regulation of security futures products).
73. See Vanessa Blum, Uncertainty Over New Stock Product: SEC, CFTC Pressured
to Clarify Rules for Single-Stock Futures, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2001, at 1 ("Rather than
actually fulfilling the contract, the parties calculate the profit or loss on paper and settle
the matter in cash.").
74. CFMA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., & 15 U.S.C.); see also Annette L. Nazareth,
Director, Division of Market Regulation, SEC, Speech at Washington Congressional
[Vol. 51:917
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regulation might create more trouble than it would solve. For example,
the underlying security in a security futures transaction might never be
delivered.75 Instead, cash exchanges could be made on each transaction.7 6
The underlying product may be stocks, but ownership rights in the stock
might never transfer. A potential legal gap therefore exists when, for
example, the SEC brings an action against an individual for committing
fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 77 That
security might never actually have been bought or sold. Instead, a
contract based upon the value of that security would have been bought
or sold. Consequently, an action for fraud "in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security" would be tenuous because there would be
no actual "purchase" or "sale., 79 Therefore, by granting jurisdiction to
the SEC to prosecute fraud on security futures, Congress potentially
contributed to the legal uncertainty enveloping these products.
Inconsistencies exist between the CFMA, the rules promulgated
thereunder, and the 1934 Act, as interpreted by common law." Despite
Congress' intent, some argue that security futures are not securities at all
and that Congress should have vested the regulatory authority solely in
the CFTC."'
Conference (May 3, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch484.htm; 146
CONG. REC. S11,926 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
75. Blum, supra note 73. Notably, Commissioner Laura Unger, in a fashion that
exemplifies the confusion and legal uncertainty that exists across industries over these
products, said in October, 2001 that she has no sense of how often security futures will be
cash settled versus physically settled. See Unger Address, supra note 48.
76. See Blum, supra note 73; see also Single-Stock Futures Trade, at http://www.cnn.
com/2001/BUSINESS/05/15/stockfutures.reut/ (last visited May 12, 2002) ("A future
obligates the holder to buy or sell the security of a company ... at a specified future date
and price, although it likely most often would be settled in cash based on the stock
price.").
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
78. Blum, supra note 73.
79. Id.
80. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). An argument could be made that security
futures should not constitute "securities" at all, and that Congress should not have
overridden common law principles and defined them as such. See e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (holding that an investment contract, for purposes of the
Securities Acts is any contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise with the expectation of profit based solely on the efforts of
others); United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (using an "economic
reality" test to define the meaning of security, stating that important factors include
alienability, the ability to liquidate, receipt of dividends, and control). Because a security
futures contract holder does not receive dividends or voting power, the Foreman economic
realities test may not classify a security futures contract as a "security." Id.
81. Id.
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Although a similar argument may be made for options on equities, the
SEC has sole jurisdiction over options on equities." The SEC must,
therefore, enforce securities fraud provisions on equity options in order
to avoid want of regulation altogether." Security futures, alternatively,
are regulated by both agencies, thereby diminishing the level of certainty
by subjecting traders to the whims and conflicts of both agencies.
The SEC has argued that it should be the sole regulator of security
futures."' The SEC was concerned that security futures would act as a
substitute for stocks, allowing investors to shop for the most
advantageous regulation.8' Consequently, both agencies' goals, in
promulgating their respective rules, was to avoid the possibility of
regulatory arbitrage by choosing a product in one market over another
based upon that market's more favorable rules."" In arguing for sole
jurisdiction over the products, the SEC maintained that security futures
would substantially affect the cash securities market."' The SEC
contended that its vested interest lies in protecting securities from
manipulation and volatility."'
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2000).
83. See id.
84. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 5-6.
85. Testimony Concerning H.R. 4541, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 Before the House Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous Materials Comm. on Commerce
(July 21, 2000) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (stating that "single-stock
futures are undeniably a substitute for stocks and stock options . . . the [regulatory]
framework must encourage fair competition among markets")(on file with author).
86. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 34 (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC)(stating that "[c]ompetitive market forces, rather than government
regulation, should pick winners and losers"); see also id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Schumer)
(arguing that he would "hate to see investors shopping as to which instrument to use or to
buy").
87. Id. at 34 (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC); see also id. at 23
(statement of Sen. Kerrey) ("The SEC claimed that one of the reasons the stock market
crashed in 1987... [was][t]rading and speculating the stock market [index futures].").
88. Id. at 34. The SEC has historically been concerned that futures on securities
create unacceptable volatility in the cash market. See Daniel F. Zimmerman, CFTC
Reauthorization in the Wake of Long-Term Capital Management, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 121, 146 (2000) (quoting then-Chairman John Shad, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission). "Stock index futures are the most highly leveraged and volatile segment of
the stock markets. Billions of dollars of transactions in stock index futures, executed in a
matter of minutes, have repeatedly sent the stock market into violent gyrations." Id.
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B. Analysis of Two Regulatory Structures and the Conflicting Rules
Imposed on Their Agents
Avoiding duplicative and inconsistent regulatory enforcement was a
chief concern of Congress, the SEC and the CFTC during the
congressional debates over security futures." Records suggest that
members of Congress were reluctant to introduce security futures
because of the inherent lack of legal certainty as to jurisdiction. ° Hence,
regulators had the same jurisdictional concerns their predecessors had in
the early 1980s.91
In an attempt to allay some of its fears, Congress mandated that the
CITTC and the SEC promulgate several rules pursuant to the CFMA.92
One such set of rules involves the cross-registration of brokers and
dealers (collectively "1BD" or "1BDs") 93  and futures commission
merchants and introducing brokers ("FCM" or "FCMs") 94 with the
89. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 6; see also Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49,
at 27 (statement of Sen. Bennett) ("Don't we want some degree of unity here where you
deal with one set of regulations and you know that another regulator will not come in and
penalize you for having done that?").
90. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 27 (statement of Sen. Bennett); see also
id. (statement of Sen. Schumer) ("[T]his bill creates regulatory disparity by substantially
different regulatory frameworks for regulation.").
91. Compare id. (statingthat it is "always a turf war.., and neither side wants to give
up their turf")(emphasis added), with Howard Simons, What's the Future for Single-Stock-
Futures?, at http://www.thestreet.comlcomment/futures/1271714.html (last visited May 12,
2002) (describing the Shad-Johnson Accord of 1982 as a "turf war between the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission") (emphasis
added).
92. See, e.g., Notice Registration as a Futures Commission Merchant or Introducing
Broker for Certain Securities Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 170 (2001); see also
Registration of Broker-Dealers Pursuant to Section 15(b)(11) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 66 Fed. Reg. 45,138 (Aug. 21, 2001).
93. A "broker" is defined by the 1934 Act as any person engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2000).
The Exchange Act defines a "dealer" as any person engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, as a part of his
regular business. Id. § 78c(a)(5).
94. A "futures commission merchant" is any individual or organization that solicits or
accepts orders to buy or sell futures or options contracts and accepts money or other assets
from customers in connection with such orders. GLOSSARY, supra note 9, at 13; see also 7
U.S.C. § la(20) (2000). An "introducing broker" is a firm or individual that solicits and
accepts futures orders from customers but does not accept money, securities, or property
from the customer. GLOSSARY, supra note 9, at 15; see also 7 U.S.C. § la(23) (2000).
Because each agency's terminology for one who deals in security futures products is
different, they will be neutrally referred to hereafter as security futures products "agents."
While "agent" may not be the most legally accurate term, it is likely the least
"commission-specific."
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opposite regulatory agency. This includes a BD's registration with the
CF-IC as a security futures product FCM, as well as an FCM's
registration with the SEC as a security futures product BD.95 Both
agencies have ultimately adopted similar provisions.96 However, the
differences between the agencies' initial proposals for notice
registration 7 illustrate the tension between the two regulatory structures.
This tension could ultimately become the basis for future difficulties.
1. Inherent Tension: An Analysis of the Proposed and Final Rules
Regarding Notice Registration
On May 17, 2001, the CFTC published, for comment, a proposed rule
for "Notice Registration as a Futures Commission Merchant or
Introducing Broker for Certain Securities Brokers or Dealers."98 This
rule became effective, without major modification, on August 17, 2001.9
Adopted pursuant to CFMA mandate,'m  this rule establishes
requirements for BDs already registered with the SEC to register as
single-stock futures agents for purposes of trading security futures
products."" The CIFTC rule allows an already registered BD to register
to trade security futures by filing a simple one-page notice with the
National Futures Association (NFA). 1°2 This notice eliminates the need
to re-register and reduces the possibility of FCMs obtaining a
competitive advantage over BDs in the security futures market."3
Congress attempted to achieve equality between industry agents in
drafting the CFMA by amending section 4f(a)(2) of the CEA and section
95. To further strengthen the argument of regulatory disparity, it should be
recognized that even something as simple as terminology can be a problem. Compare
Notice Registration as a Futures Commission Merchant or Introducing Broker for Certain
Securities Brokers or Dealers, 17 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 170 (2001) (referring to security futures
agents as security futures products "futures commission merchants"), with Registration of
Broker-Dealers Pursuant to Section 15(b)(11) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 66
Fed. Reg. 45,138 (Aug. 27, 2001) (labeling the same agents as security futures products
"broker-dealers").
96. 17 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 170 (2001).
97. "Notice registration," as used in the CFMA, refers to the process of cross-
registering with the opposite agency. CFMA § 203(a)(2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b)(11)(A)(2000)).
98. 66 Fed. Reg. 27,476 (May 17, 2001).
99. 66 Fed. Reg. 43,080 (Aug. 17,2001).
100. CFMA § 203(a)(2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(11)(A)(2000)).
101. 66 Fed. Reg. 43,080 (Aug. 17,2001).
102. 66 Fed. Reg. 27,476-77 (May 17,2001); 66 Fed. Reg. 43,080-81 (Aug. 17,2001).
103. 66 Fed. Reg. 43,080, 43,081 (Aug. 17, 2001) (describing how several comment
letters to the CFTC's proposed notice registration rule asked that both agencies' rules be
identical to avoid adverse advantages of BDs over FCMs).
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15(b)(11) of the 1934 Act. These sections mandate that registration is
effective with the submission of notice, if:
(A) the BD or FCM is already registered as such with its own
commission;
(B) they limit their orders to security futures products;
(C) in such a way that each commission may prescribe, the BD
or FCM files written notice with the other commission;
(D) the registration from the BD or FCM's own commission is
not suspended; and
(E) the BD or FCM is a member of a national association
(National Securities Association for BDs or the National
Futures Association for FCMs).0 4
These five statutory requirements constitute essentially all the notice
registration requirements established by the CFMA. However, the
CFMA required each commission to make its own determination of what
constitutes sufficient "notice."105
The CFTC decided to require a one-page written notice with basic
information to be filed with the National Futures Association.' 6 In
contrast, the SEC proposed a more complex procedure for FCMs to
register as security futures agents."" Demonstrative of the differing
cultures and regulatory structures of the two agencies, the SEC proposed
that FCMs file Form BD, the same form filed by brokers and dealers
registering with the SEC as full brokers or dealers.0 Several comments,
denouncing the SEC's proposed rules, indicate a fear that BDs might be
given a competitive advantage in filing procedures over their FCM
counterparts.9109
On August 27, 2001, the SEC published its final rules relating to
"Registration of Broker-Dealers Pursuant to Section 15(b)(11) of the
104. CFMA § 203(a)(2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
78o(b)(2000)); Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4f(a)(2)(2000).
105. CFMA § 203(a).
106. 66 Fed. Reg. 27,476, 27,477 (May 17, 2001).
107. Proposed Registration of Broker Dealers Requirement of Securities Exchange
Commission, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,042 (June 26, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 248,
249).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b1-1. Form BD is a more lengthy, complex, and scrutinizing
form than that which the CFTC proposed to effectuate notice registration. See Notice
Registration as a Futures Commission Merchant or Introducing Broker for Certain
Securities Brokers or Dealers, 66 Fed. Reg. 43,080 (Aug. 17, 2001); see also 15 U.S.C. §
78o(a) (2000).
109. See 66 Fed. Reg. 43,080, 43,081 (Aug. 17, 2001).
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934.""'  These rules were considered a
scaled-back version of the initial proposal."' Under the final rules, an
FCM, to register with the SEC as a security futures agent, must complete
a new form, Form BD-N, to effectuate the registration. "2 Form BD-N is
a new and moderated derivative of Form BD."3 The new form includes,
essentially, those requirements mandated by the parallel CFTC
registration process." 4 These requirements include statements indicating
that the entity registering meets the five statutory requirements for
notice registration with the CFTC"" and other basic identifying
information.' 6 Form BD-N will be maintained by the NFA, the same
association that will maintain the notice registration forms filed by
FCMs."7
The differences between the registration requirements illustrates the
inherent tension that exists between the CFTC and the SEC. This
tension exists not only between the agencies' regulatory mentalities, but
also between their regulatory structures."1
As a precursor to other potentially disparate regulatory treatment, the
agencies' notice registration requirements, at least initially, displayed the
differing levels of regulation between the agencies. Another such
example is the suitability requirements imposed on BDs by the securities
industry."' The CFTC has traditionally had a slightly more relaxed
treatment for FCM recommendation requirements.'2"
2. More Tension: Analysis of Conflicting Suitability Requirements
Similar to the business merger, cultures often clash when ideas merge.
Although the alliance looks attractive on paper, there is a lack of
110. Final Rule on Registration of Broker Dealers by SEC, 66 Fed. Reg. 45,138 (Aug.
27,2001)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240,248,249).
111. Id. at 45,144.
112. 66 Fed. Reg. 45,138 (Aug. 27, 2001)(amending 34 Act Rule 15b1 1-1).
113. Seeid. at 45,139.
114. Compare id. with 66 Fed. Reg. 27,476 (May 17, 200 1).
115. See supra text accompanying note 104.
116. Final Rule on Registration of Broker Dealers, 66 Fed. Reg. 45,138-39 (Aug. 27,
2001).
117. See id. at 45,141 (stating that NFA will maintain form BD-N); see also 66 Fed.
Reg. 43,080 (2001) (stating that the NFA will maintain the CFTC's notice registration
forms).
1& See, e.g., Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, Financial Innovation and
Uncertain Regulation: Selected Issues Regarding New Product Development, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1431 (1991).
119. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 405.
120. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 25-26.
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cohesiveness in the collective mentalities. The CFIFC and the SEC were
created for distinctly different reasons and serve substantially different
purposes in their respective industries. 21 Suitability requirements are a
potentially uncertain area that security futures agents face in serving
their clients.' 2 Because the SEC and the CFFC serve different functions,
a stark contrast exists between their industries' respective suitability
frameworks. 23
One of the primary goals in creating the joint regulatory framework
for security futures was to limit regulatory "shopping."' 24  This goal
resulted, at least in part, because of the possibility of inconsistent
enforcement of suitability requirements.' 5  Arthur Levitt, then SEC
Chairman, stated that he would "hate to see investors shopping as to
which instrument to use or to buy for that reason."' 26 Although many of
the regulatory "shopping" problems have been resolved in terms of
disparity between particular products, many of the requirements imposed
121. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49 (statement of William Rainer, Chairman,
CFTC)("[W]e have two wonderful industries, a securities industry ... and the futures
industry, and they have grown up in different regulatory environments."); see also James
Newsome, CFFC Chairman, Address at CFFC Summer Intern Program (July 29, 2001)
(describing the different roles of the CFTC and the SEC). Chairman Newsome explained
that the CFTC is a protective regulatory agency designed to ensure stability and
competitiveness, while the SEC is intended to protect the capital formation market. Id.;
see also Unger Address, supra note 48 (embracing the role of the securities market as one
of capital formation).
122. See e.g., NASD Rules 2310, 2860, IM-2860-2.
123. Testimony Concerning H.R. 4541, supra note 85 (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC)("In the securities markets, recommendations that brokers make to
investors are governed by the suitability rules of self-regulatory organizations subject to
SEC oversight ... [It] is quite different under the futures laws. Investors receive a one-
time disclosure document informing them that they can lose money."). In general, the
securities industry's suitability rule prohibits brokers from making unsuitable
recommendations in light of the investor's objectives, experience, sophistication and
financial status. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 405 (requiring the broker to use "due diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer"); O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty, 965 F.2d
893, 898 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that to establish unsuitability based on fraud by conduct,
the plaintiff must prove (1) that the broker's recommended securities which were
unsuitable in light of the investor's objectives; (2) the broker recommended or purchased
the securities with an intent to defraud; and (3) the broker exercised control over the
investor's account). See also NFA Online News, NFA Prepares to Regulate Security
Futures Products, at http://www.nfa.futures.org/news/newsFactsActions/
nllqtr2001_3.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2001).
124. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49 (statement of Sen. Schumer).
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on security futures agents (such as notice registration, suitability, and
best execution) were not finalized before initiation of trading.
Although the securities industry imposes strict suitability requirements
on its agents, the futures market has traditionally had no suitability
rule. 27 The "SEC and securities exchange officials are concerned that
the lack of a futures market suitability rule would expose customers to
risk.' "' Security futures are complex, highly leveraged and potentially
volatile products. 29 The concern is that FCMs would market these
products to unsophisticated retail investors without any warning as to the
dangers."' In drafting the CFMA, legislators required the NFA to adopt
a suitability rule for security futures. 3' Before security futures products
could be traded, "NFA must qualify as a limited purpose national
securities association.' 32  Qualification standards include instituting
customer protection and suitability rules similar to those of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).'33 NFA asserted that it was
continuously working with the SEC to develop rules equivalent to those
enforced in the securities industry. ' 4 Under current rules, NFA requires
"adequate risk disclosure,"'35 but NFA claims that it will eventually
prohibit agents "from making unsuitable recommendations.""' Because
of the difference between the securities and futures industries,
finalization of rules has been slow.
37
The NFA rule-making process is a clear illustration of the tension
between the securities and futures markets' mode of operation and
regulation. Another example of the tension between rules imposed on
agents is the SEC's best execution standard.'3
127. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 25.
128. Id.
129. GAO Report, supra, note 3, at 26.
130. Id. (stating that the "SEC and U.S. securities exchanges are concerned that retail
customers buying or selling stock-based futures would be exposed to the risk of unlimited
loss associated with an adverse price change . . . [potentially] undermin[ing] investor
confidence").
131. NFA Online News, supra note 123.
132. NFA, Single Stock Futures Regulatory Update, at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
news/singlestock/singlestock.pdf (last visited May 12, 2002).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing NFA Compliance Rule 2-30).
136. Id.
137. Bill Barnhart, Single-Stock Futures Get Truly Timely, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2002.
138. NFA, Single Stock Futures Regulatory Update, at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
news/singlestock/singlestock.pdf (last visited May 12, 2002).
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3. Even More Tension: Best Execution and Dissemination of Order
Information
The NFA examined the need to adopt a best execution rule for
security futures.139 The NFA explains on its Web site that it is difficult to
"know what the best execution issues will be."'" The securities industry,
however, has such a requirement in place, and the potential for conflict
141
exists if regulatory frameworks differ between industries.
The securities industry's best execution rule "requires a broker-dealer
to seek the most favorable terms reasonably available under the
circumstances for a customer's transaction.""14 In the absence of such a
rule by the futures industry, questions arise as to the manner in which
the futures industry will regulate not-so-scrupulous security futures
agents. 43 It would be possible for a security futures agent, in the absence
of such regulation, to avoid obtaining best execution prices for his
customers and to avoid disseminating information on order execution.
These practices are strictly regulated in the securities industry.144
Equally troubling is the possibility that the securities industry may not
impose its new broker price dissemination requirements on security
futures agents."4 In the summer of 2001, the SEC's new dissemination
rule for order execution went into effect.' 46 The rule requires market
centers and BDs to make publicly available periodic reports of customer
order execution quality statistics and routing practices. 147 The new
dissemination rule, however, will not likely be in effect for security
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 27.
142. Workshop on Operations Issues for Single Stock Futures, SIA Operations
Conference 21 (Apr. 28, 2001) (describing NASD's best execution standards and
questioning whether those standards would apply to the security futures market).
143. See id. at 21-22.
144. Id.
145. Cf Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-5
(2000) (explaining that Rule llAcl-5, which mandates dissemination of order execution,
will not apply to orders for listed options). Because commodity futures laws generally
track securities laws, see Hlavinka v. Comm. Futures Trading Comm'n, 867 F.2d 1029,
1034 (7th Cir. 1989), and because regulators have agreed that equity options and security
futures are economically similar, see GAO Report, supra note 3, at 9-10 ("Options on
single stocks serve similar economic functions as would be served by futures on single
stocks."), it is likely that the two products will be regulated similarly, and thus unlikely
that security futures will be included in the dissemination rule either.
146. See generally Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practice, 17 C.F.R. §
240.11Acl-5 (2000).
147. See Laura Unger, Timeless Principles of Investing in an Electronic Age (May 6,
2001), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch487.htm.
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futures products.'4' Despite regulators' attempts to achieve regulatory
parity between security futures and their underlying equities,149
differences invariably exist. One product may, therefore, ultimately have
a competitive regulatory advantage over another.
The next section of this Comment addresses the legal uncertainty of
security futures products. The tension between the prosecution of fraud
by the CFrC and the SEC is discussed, as well as issues relating to
margin level parity and the debate over how to tax security futures.
These discussions demonstrate the inherent inconsistencies between
securities and futures regulation.
C. Analysis of Two Regulatory Structures and the Conflicting Rules
Regarding Margin Levels
Another concern for regulators authorizing security futures products is
the effect the products may have on the cash and options markets.50
Arthur Levitt noted that "the framework must encourage fair
competition among markets."'' Because margin levels generally differ
among financial instruments, 52 regulators wanted to ensure that no
particular product obtained an unfair regulatory advantage over others.
148. Cf Disclosure of Order Execution and Routing Practice, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2000)
(citing cost-benefit analysis as not warranting the placement of these dissemination rules
on options); see also supra note 145.
149. See Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 27 (statement of Sen. Schumer);
see also id. at 11 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors).
150. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 17 (testimony of Lawrence Summers).
151. Id. at 33 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
152 Compare margin definition in securities industry:
Traditionally, stock margin has been used to control the allocation of credit,
reduce the risk of price instability, and protect investors from becoming overly
leveraged .... [Tihe minimum down payment that a customer must pay to a
broker to fund a stock purchase. The remainder of the purchase price can be
borrowed from the broker, with the broker then retaining the stock as collateral
on the loan.
GAO Report, supra note 3, at 21 (emphasis added) with the definition of margin in the
futures industry:
An amount of money deposited by both buyers and sellers of futures contracts
and by sellers of option contracts to ensure performance of the terms of the
contract (the making or taking delivery of the commodity or the cancellation of
the position by a subsequent offsetting trade). Margin in futures is not a down
payment, as in securities, but rather a performance bond.
GLOSSARY, supra note 9, at 16-17 (emphasis added).
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Stocks generally have substantially higher margin requirements than
options or futures. Investors buying stock on margin in the cash
market are subject to a fifty percent margin requirement. In contrast,
margins on futures contracts are much lower and generally range from
one to seven percent.'55 The requirement for options on equities is
twenty percent of the underlying security.5 6 The different rates illustrate
the radically diverse roles margins play within each industry. These
differing rates and varying purposes of margin requirements across
industries led regulators to conclude that they should "level [the] playing
field" to avoid the possibility of regulatory arbitrage.'57 "Competitive
market forces, rather than government regulation, should pick winners
and losers."'58
The CFMA requires that initial and maintenance margins for security
futures be set at levels comparable to those for options.159 Defining the
word "comparable" presented difficulty for those developing the
regulatory framework. 6° Attempting to achieve regulation parallel to
options, the CFMA granted authority to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System to establish this framework for security
futures.161 In turn, the Federal Reserve used its authority, granted by
CFMA, to re-delegate that responsibility to the SEC and the CFTC for
joint regulation.' 62 On October 4, 2001, the two agencies released
proposed rules that were scheduled to be finalized by mid-December
2001,163 but did not receive final approval until after May, 2002.
153. See Credit by Brokers and Dealers (Regulation T), 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-220.132
(2001); Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 18 (testimony of Alan Greenspan).
154. Credit by Brokers and Dealers (Regulation T), 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-220.132 (2001).
155. Howard Simons, What's the Future for Single-Stock-Futures?, at http://www.
thestreet.com/comment/futures/1273362.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2001); see also Joint
Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 18 (testimony of Alan Greenspan).
156. See, e.g., NASD Rule 2520; Chicago Board Options Exchange Rule 12.3; New
York Stock Exchange Rule 431; American Stock Exchange Rule 462.
157. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 17 (testimony of Lawrence Summers).
15& Id. at 33 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC); see also id. at 28
(statement of Sen. Schumer) ("[N]either regulation nor the lack of it should pick winners
and losers among products or exchanges and fair competition should.").
159. CFMA § 206(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994)).
160. 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Oct. 4,2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41 & 242).
161. CFMA § 206(b)(1) (2000) (amending section 7(c) of the 1.934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78(g)(c)(2) (1994)).
162. Id. The Federal Reserve delegated that authority by letter dated March 6, 2001.
See 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720, at Appendix B (Oct. 4, 2001).
163. Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Oct. 4,
2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41 & 242); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 55,608 (Nov. 2,
2001) (extending the deadline for comment on the proposed margin rules relating to
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The concern that different margin requirements for different products
would lead to unfair advantages also prompted fears that lower margins
would give greater leverage to investors.' 64 Greater leverage, regulators
argued, effectively increases the potential for investor loss.'65 The fear of
investors having too much leverage is also a product of the two
industries' different approaches to margin time frames.
66
Options and futures margins are paid at least daily to cover contracts
that are decreasing in value.' 67 Alternatively, margins on securities must
be covered within five days of the trade."" Because stocks can be
extremely volatile, the SEC has argued that daily, or even hourly, margin
calls on leveraged security futures contracts may be too dangerous for
retail investors. 69
The counterargument, however, is that more frequent margin calls
serve to alleviate volatility because they enable investors to "liquidate
losing positions before more significant losses can accumulate.', 70 One
thing is certain, each industry's margin time frame and margin level
requirements constitute different approaches for different purposes,
which illustrates the tension existing between the two industries.
D. Analysis of the Tax Consequences of Security Futures
Security futures will not be subject to the same federal income tax
treatment as other futures contracts. 171 Capital gains on security futures
will have the same tax treatment as those on the underlying security; a
security futures from November 5, 2001, to December 5, 2001). The proposed rules
establish margin levels for security futures at twenty percent of the current market value
of the position. 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Oct. 4, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41 &
242). This requirement appears to be consistent with the initial and maintenance margins
for equity options, which the CFMA requires. CFMA § 206(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2000)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994)).
164. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 21.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 23.
168. Id. at 21.
169. Id. at 23. The set of rules proposed by the SEC and the CFrC in October 2001,
would require the initial margin to be collected within three business days of the trade. 66
Fed. Reg. 50,730 (Oct. 4, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41 & 242). This is
somewhat of a compromise between the five-day requirement in the securities market and
the more frequent collection in the futures market. See id.
170. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 23.
171. Mutual Fund Cafr, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000:
Watershed Legislation for Derivatives (May 2001), at http://www.mfcafe.com/legal/ls/html
(citing Pub. L. No. 106-554 (2000), section 1234B of the Internal Revenue Code, enacted
as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001).
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parallel to the tax liabilities that options on stocks receive.72
Comparable to other rules promulgated pursuant to the CFMA,
regulators have sought parity between equity options, security futures,
and cash securities in attempting to avoid any sort of regulatory
arbitrage.'73
Distinctions between the industries are, however, inevitable. Inherent
differences between futures and stocks preclude them from being
regulated with absolute parity.174 An investor wishing to avoid taxes on
stocks has the option of deferring capital gains as long as he or she
wishes.'75 This results in the investor being able to effectively choose
when to realize capital gains and whether those gains will be short or
long term. 76 "Because stocks have no maturity date other than the life of
the issuing corporation, this deferral can endure for years. ' ' 7 Hence, the
investor is essentially the master of his tax domain.
Alternatively, futures are taxed at regular intervals (the expiration
date of the contract) and because most futures contracts are shorter than
one year, they must realize short-term capital gains,' which are taxed at
the taxpayer's ordinary income rate.79 Because long-term capital gains
rates are generally lower than their short-term counterparts, the result is
a significant tax disincentive to invest in security futures over cash
equities. '
Cash stocks also receive a competitive advantage in some of the most
heavily traded investment vehicles. "[M]ost tax-advantaged accounts
such as IRAs, . . . 401(k)s [and] pension funds ... are restricted in their
use of futures and other derivatives . . . .""' Because a major portion of
the investor community trades specifically for their retirement
172. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1234B(a)(1) (2001).
173. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49 (statement of Sen. Schumer) ("[Slingle-
stock futures [should] be allowed to be traded if and only if we could achieve regulatory
parity for futures and their underlying equities.',); see also Annette L. Nazareth, Director,
Division of Market Regulation, SEC, Speech at Washington Congressional Conference
(May 3, 2001).
174. GAO Report, supra note 3 at 25-26.
175. Simons, supra note 155.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 26 U.S.C. § 1222(1)(2000) (defining a short-term capital gain as a "gain from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held for not more than one year"); see also Simons,
supra note 155.
179. See 26 U.S.C. § l(h)(2000).
180. Simons, supra note 155.
181. Id.
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accounts,"" which are usually tax advantaged, relinquishing those
advantages has the potential to negatively affect the popularity of
security futures products. 8' The tax implications, though not a direct
product of congressional intent, demonstrate another area of regulatory
tension between securities and futures."4
E. Fraud
Fraud and market manipulation provisions constitute integral
components of the SEC's and the CFTC's regulatory frameworks and
daily operations.'85 Despite the common purpose and intent, the
agencies' rules governing market manipulation and fraud are vastly
different in both their construction and enforcement.'
Because security futures may be regulated as securities and as
futures,"" the SEC and the CFTC were concerned that joint regulation
might be overly burdensome and could impair each agency's
enforcement against fraudulent practices."" The CFMA addressed this
issue by granting each agency authority to initiate enforcement
proceedings, subject to notification to the opposite agency.'89 The CFMA
failed to contemplate, however, that each agency's antifraud rules are
different in their orientation and enforcement.' 9  Hence, legal
uncertainty and tension are inevitable.
182- See ALAN R. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 4 (Examples &
Explanations Series, Aspen Publishing 1998) (describing how, as of 1995, pension fund
investment is the fastest growing category of U.S. equity investors, constituting twenty-two
percent of the market).
183. See 146 CONG. REC. S11,926 (daily ed. Dec. 15,2000) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
184. Id.; see also Simons, supra note 155.
185. See generally Testimony Concerning H.R. 4541, supra note 85 (statement of
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
186. See GAO Report, supra note 3, at 23-24.
187. CFMA § 201 (2000) (modifying the CEA, 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(31)(1994), and the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(55)(A)(1994)) (defining a security future as a security, and
specifically, a contract for sale for future delivery of a single security or of a narrow-based
security index); see also Nazareth Speech, supra note 1_73; 146 CONG. REC. S1 1,926 (Dec.
15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
18& Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49 (statement of William Rainer, Chairman,
CFTC). See generally Testimony Concerning H.R. 4541, supra note 85 (statement of
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
189. CFMA §§ 204, 205 (2000); see also Key Aspects of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, at http://www.morganlewis.com/wpcommodity.htm (last
visited May 12,2002).
190. Zimmerman, supra note 88, at 148. Another troubling aspect of the agencies'
differing antifraud rules is the potential uncertainty surrounding insider trading and
[Vol. 51:917
Joint Regulation of Single Stock Futures
1. Antifraud Rules
The differences in regulatory structures present the possibility of
inconsistent and duplicative enforcement. One agency may initiate
enforcement proceedings while the other deems proceedings
unnecessary.' Alternatively, though equally as troubling, both agencies
may pursue a claim, thereby subjecting violators to something analogous
to double jeopardy."" This Comment compares the antifraud provisions
in Section 4b of the CEA (4b)'93 and Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act'94 and
Rule 10b-5' 95 (10b-5) promulgated thereunder.
a. Does the Restrictive "For or on behalf of' Language in 4b Apply to
Institutional Investors?
Section 4b(a)(2) of the CEA,'96 in relevant part, bars fraud by "any
person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, any
contract of sale of any [futures contract] ... made, or to be made, for or
on behalf of any other person... The problematic language that exists,
at least in the security futures context, is the phrase "for or on behalf of
any other person." The same language does not exist in 10b-5.'9
The troubling aspect of this language pertains to how 4b, the principle
antifraud and antimanipulation provision of the CEA,'99 applies to
security futures transactions between principles. The uncertainty of this
language leaves unanswered the question of whether security futures
transactions conducted without intermediation by brokers or other
beneficial ownership issues of security futures. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 40-41; see
also Single Stock Futures Workshop, supra note 142.
191. Cf Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49 (statement of William Rainer,
Chairman, CFTC) ("CFTC staff express[ed] concern that an umbrella approach, meaning
the application of the panoply of both securities and commodities regulations to these
products, could result in overly burdensome regulation.").
192. Id. Both agencies may decide to prosecute and could subsequently reach
inconsistent conclusions, thereby ultimately contributing to the legal uncertainty
surrounding security futures. "[I]n the immediate future [security futures] will present an
array of novel challenges in interpreting securities law." Frank Partnoy, Some Policy
Implications of Single-Stock Futures, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10,
University of San Diego School of Law 1, at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract
id=261896 (last visited Oct. 25, 2001).
193. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2000).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
195. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
196. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1994).
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2001).
199. 146 CONG. REC. S11,926 (Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
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persons acting "for or on behalf of" other parties, are afforded 4b
protection against fraud and manipulation. If 4b does not afford
protection in this situation, then conceivably, principle-to-principle
transactions, which may include most trades conducted at the
institutional level, 2°° are not regulated by the futures antifraud provision.
The legislative history of the CEA includes some indication that 4b
was proposed to act as a general antifraud provision. 1 It also illustrates,
however, that 4b was intended to apply only to brokers acting "for or on
behalf of" their customers." Senator Norris indicated that "[Section
4b(a)] applies to an operator on the board of trade who is using a client's
money for investment ... [and] [t]he only purpose of the ... [provision]
is to protect money that is really a trust fund."203 It is therefore a stretch
to apply 4b to transactions between principles because the principles
would not be acting "for or on behalf of" anyone, except themselves.
Congressional hearings on the CFMA imply that Congress knew the
"for or on behalf of" language was problematic.2°4 Congress left 4b
intact, however, expressly declining to amend that specific provision.05
Instead, it inserted language in several places in the Act, in provisions
not related to security futures, that appears to broaden the applicability
of 4b. This language specifies that 4b would apply to certain categories
of non-intermediated transactions between principles without anyone
200. The CFMA prohibits security futures trading between principles before August
21, 2001. CFMA § 202 (2000).
201. 80 CONG. REc. 7,871 (May 25,1936) (statement of Sen. Robinson) ("[T]he object
of the legislation is, or should be, to prevent deceptive or fraudulent transactions. Any
language which accomplishes that end is worthy of consideration."). But see id. (stating
that a broker "has no right to [buy and sell for his clients] in a way that will sacrifice the
interests of one client.., for his own personal advantage" because he an agent).
202. Id.
203. 80 CONG. REC. 7,911 (Apr. 26, 1936) (statement of Senator Norris); see also H.R.
REP. No. 1522, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (May 9, 1934) (stating, in a bill with language
similar to CEA § 4b, that the provision "prohibits traders in acting for customers in futures
transactions to cheat, defraud, or deceive customers"); H.R. REP. No. 1551, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. at 2-3 (June 7, 1932)(stating, in a bill with language similar to CEA § 4b, that the
antifraud provision was needed because "those who trade in the futures markets are in no
position to obtain the necessary evidence with which to proceed against unscrupulous
dealers. They are not even in a position always to know the extent to which they have
been cheated by unscrupulous brokers and commission firms.").
204. 146 CONG. REC. S11,926 (Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lugar) ("By
refraining from altering certain sections of the Act, this legislation re-affirms the
importance of specific authorities granted the CFTC . . . . [T]he Commission has
consistently used Section 4b to combat fraudulent conduct.").
205. Id.
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acting "for or on behalf of" someone else.2°6 Because Congress did not
include this broadening language in the security futures portion of the
legislation, one could deduce that it did not intend the language to apply
to security futures.2° Thus, by specifically reserving the application of 4b
to certain situations within the CFMA and declining to apply it to
security futures transactions, Congress' actions suggest both a negative
implication and an intentional decision. 2°8
Statutory construction notwithstanding, several members of Congress
stated in their introductions of the bill that 4b is a general antifraud
provision, meant to protect the entire futures market.2°9 Senator Lugar
stated that "[i]t is the intent of Congress in retaining Section 4b of the
[CEA] that the provision not be limited to fiduciary, broker/customer or
other agency-like relationships. Section 4b provides the [CFTC] with
broad authority to police fraudulent conduct within its jurisdiction.
210
This statement suggests that Congress intended 4b to apply to all futures
transactions.
Although this interpretation may appear to resolve the problem of 4b's
inapplicability to security futures transactions between principles, it is
nonetheless, only quasi-legislative intent. Senator Lugar's statement
demonstrates the intent of a current Congress discussing past legislation,
and thus represents only quasi-legislative intent.1 The only Congress
that can state its legislative intent is the one that passes the actual
206. See, e.g., CFMA § 102 (2000) (making otherwise inapplicable section 4b
applicable to off-exchange sales of foreign currency futures by FCMs); see also id. § 106
(reserving authority to apply section 4b to certain transactions in exempt commodities).
207. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (quoting Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.");
see also Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 241 (3d Cir. 1999).
208. See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67 (1995) (stating that the negative pregnant rule
of construction requires "that an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with
statutory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the specified
instance"); see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432.
209. 146 CONG. REc. S11,926 (Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Lugar); see also id.
(statement of Sens. Ewing and Combest).
210. Id. at 11,926 (Dec. 15, 2000)(statement of Senator Lugar).
211. South Dakota v. Tankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 355 (1998) ("We have often
observed.., that 'the views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier one."') (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 348-49 (1963)).
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legislation.22 Although the view of the 106th Congress may shed some
light on an earlier Congress's intent, it is not dispositive.2"3
Nonetheless, even if section 4b does not apply to security futures
transactions between principles, principles are still covered by the
antifraud provisions in 10b-5."' A legal gap, however, exists between the
industries. Uncertainty and inconsistency in enforcement against fraud
could increase the potential for regulatory arbitrage by investors and
afford competitive advantages for products traded on certain
exchanges."5 Regulatory parity this is not.
III. POPULARITY OF THE PRODUCT: ARE SECURITY FUTURES WORTH
THE TROUBLE?
The September 11th attacks in New York, Washington, and
Pennsylvania, the ensuing economic fallout, and a relatively slow moving
rulemaking process have served to push back the effective date for
security futures trading."t 6 Regulators had hoped to be ready to begin
processing trades by early 2002, but the trading delay ultimately
extended beyond May of that year and into the second quarter of 2002.27
The following section examines the potential popularity of security
futures products. Advantages, disadvantages, and proposals about how
to achieve security futures success are included.
A. Popularity of the Product: Advantages of Security Futures
Despite this Comment's critical tone, security futures may achieve
success, at least mildly, in the institutional arena. Some advantages of
these products include lower transactional costs, easier access across
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). There is no restrictive "for or on behalf of'
language in 10b-5. Id.
215. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49, at 33 (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, SEC) ("Competitive market forces, rather than government regulation, should
pick winners and losers.").
216. Daily Briefing, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 9, 2001, at 2C. The CFMA, however,
required that security futures begin trading in the retail market on December 21, 2001.
CFMA § 202 (2000) (amending 1.5 U.S.C. § 78f(g)(5)(B)(1994)).
217. Daily Briefing, supra note 216; Bill Barnhart, Single-Stock Futures Get Truly
Timely, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 2002; Alex Skorecki, US. Regulatory Hurdles Delay Liffe
Move: Exchange Chief Hits Out at Unexplained Postponements to Allow Trading in Single
Stock Futures, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 23, 2002, at 3.
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markets, and, despite equivalent margin levels, the potential for a slight
• 218
margin advantage to be achieved by trading security futures.
Trading security futures offers a significant advantage because they are
219
effectively traded at a lower cost than options transactions. One
security futures transaction may replicate the desired effect of two
options trades °20 Hence, transactional costs for this desired trade would
be cut by fifty percent.
Also significant for the potential success of security futures is the
ability to trade futures from a securities and options account. 2' Futures
on individual stocks and narrow-based stock indexes will give securities
account holders access to the futures markets.22 It provides "cost savings
for customers, who can do all their equity trading in one place." 3
Investors' abilities to trade in different industries from one account
suggests the opportunity to create substantial leverage, arbitrage
positions, and hedging strategies across industries.224
In their joint-proposed release regarding regulation of margin levels
for security futures products, the SEC and the CFTC proposed a flat
margin level . 22 This flat-level is based on the comparable short, at-the-
money level for equity options.22 Although the CFMA suggests acting
otherwise,727 the agencies decided to effectively give security futures a
slight advantage over equity-based options 8
Facially, at least, the proposed rules attempt to achieve parity with
margin levels of options.229 The rules set initial and maintenance margin
218. See infra, notes 225-233 and accompanying text.
219. Alex McCallum, Exchanges Draw Swords for Single Stock Futures, at http://www.
test.crbindex.com/pubs/traderlbtvl0n3/btvl0n3al.asp (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
220. GAO Report, supra note 3, at 9-10 ("Options on single stocks serve similar
economic functions as ... futures on single stocks .... For example, by buying a call
option on a single stock and selling a put option on the same stock, a single stock futures
contract can be created synthetically.").
221. McCallum, supra note 219.
222. Single Stock Futures are Set to Debut on August 21: Is Anyone Ready to Trade?, 28
SECS. WK. 1 (Sept. 20,2001).
223. Id. at 1 (citing Paul Stevens, President, Options Clearing Corporation).
224. Id.
225. Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Oct. 4,
2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 41 & 242).
226. Proposed Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, 66 Fed. Reg.
50,720 (Oct. 4,2001).
227. CFMA § 206 (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (1994)).
228. Proposed Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, 66 Fed. Reg.
50,720-21 (Oct. 4, 2001).
229. Id.
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levels for each long or short security future's position at twenty percent
of the current market value of the underlying security. 3 The rules also
contemplate the effect of double transactional costs such as those in
synthetic security futures.2"
However, the rules only "allow," but do not require, the national
securities exchanges to implement lower margin requirements for such
"hedging strategies." 32 Therefore, coupled with the double transaction
fees for synthetic security futures, the possible payment of two separate
sets of margin requirements, one for the "call" option and one for the
"put" option, could provide a slight advantage to security futures over
equity-based options. 3' Depending upon whether the exchanges decide
to give security futures this edge, investors may be given an incentive to
trade security futures over equity-based options.
B. Popularity of the Product: Many Issues Have Been Left Unresolved
and Security Futures Likely Will Not "Hit the Ground Running' 24
Security futures are essentially a solution without a problem. 35
Internationally, security futures have not met much demand,236 and many
suggest that there will be a similar lack of enthusiasm in the United
States.'37 This lack of enthusiasm results, in part, from the regulatory
hurdles and legal uncertainty of trading security futures. Contributing
equally though, is the inability of investors to classify these new
instruments. 38 Security futures essentially straddle the institutional and
retail markets, leaving them without adequate classification in either
category and without a genuine trading class.2-9
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (discussing how a synthetic security
future can be created by buying a "call" option on a single stock and selling a "put" option
on the same stock).
232. Proposed Customer Margin Rules Relating to Security Futures, 66 Fed. Reg.
50,720 (Oct. 4,2001).
233. Id.
234. Allison, supra note 56 (security futures may not "hit the ground running")
(quoting Jon Najarian, Founder Mercury Trading).
235. Simons, supra note 155.
236. Nasdaq Press Release, supra note 56 (describing how popularity of security
futures on LIFFE has been somewhat slow); see also GAO Report, supra note 3, at 11.
237. Allison, supra note 56.
238. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC) (stating that the bill to repeal Shad-Johnson "is taking basically an institutional
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The popularity of security futures products may be greater in the
institutional market than on the retail side because institutions have the
"sophistication and research tools to use [them]." 24°  Phil Johnson,
former-Chairman of the CFFC, concluded, however, that "the CFMA
allows institutions to trade off-exchange among themselves, where they
wouldn't have to put up margins or deal with the higher tax rates ....
The institutions will have to make a serious choice." 24' Security futures
products were intended to be a retail investment option,242 but will likely
turn out to be a misregulated institutional trading product.
Regulatory tension, interagency confusion, and lack of interest in the
product will scuttle, at least initially, the popularity of security futures.
This Comment concludes by proposing steps the agencies and Self
Regulatory Organizations (SROs) should take in order to limit legal
uncertainty and enhance the popularity of security futures.
C. Popularity of the Product: Steps to Take to Achieve Security Futures'
Success
Before security futures can start trading and in order to reduce legal
uncertainty, the above-mentioned regulatory hurdles must be overcome.
Once these issues are resolved, there are several steps the agencies and
SROs should take in order to effectuate a successful introduction of
security futures.
An underlying goal of the CFMA and the rules promulgated pursuant
to that Act is the capturing of the spirit of a competitive marketplace.243
Congress attempted to preserve that general mood of competition and
innovation in the Act.44 Accordingly, the establishment of several
240. Single Stock Futures, supra note 222 (quoting Paul Stevens, President, Options
Clearing Corporation).
241. Id.
242. See generally Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49.
243. Id. (statement of Sen. Lugar) ("The goal of this legislation is to ensure that the
United States remains a global leader in the derivatives marketplace.").
244. See id. (statement of Sen. Lugar); see also Hearing on H.R. 4541, supra note I
(statement of Mark D. Young, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of the Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) (stating that the CFMA
"promotes competition ... [and, as a result, the CBOT] and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange are restructuring and reorganizing their business operations to maximize the
chances of capturing the benefits of new technology and innovations."). Although this
Comment argues against joint regulation of security futures because "the very fact that we
have two regulators regulating similar segments of the market provides us with some
irrationalities to begin with," the CFMA might actually foster competition for investors
across the marketplaces of BDs and FCMs. Joint Hearing on S. 2697, supra note 49
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competing markets is a prerequisite for the success of security futures.
This is already under way.25  Equally essential, though, is achieving
fungibility in products and mandating uniformity across trading
platforms.2A
If the introduction of security futures has done nothing else, it has
made market boundaries murkier and forced traditional rivals to work
together. Not only have the CFFC and the SEC mutually acquiesced to
share regulation for the good of the product, but three other groups have
teamed-up as well. The CBOE, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
(CME) and the CBOT, the three big Chicago derivatives exchanges,247
have agreed to create a system for trading security futures.m The
commitment of these historically fierce rivals indicates the potential
significance of being first-to-market with a platform to trade U.S.
security futures2 9
In March 2001, the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) and the London
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE)20
formed a joint venture to create a platform to rival the Chicago market.5
LIFFE has been trading futures contracts on "universal" stocks since the
beginning of 2001.2 The joint venture promises not only to expand the
European security futures market, but to initiate the U.S. security futures
market through LIFFE CONNECT, LIFFE's electronic trading
platform.z3 Therefore, U.S. security futures trading on Nasdaq-LIFFE
will be conducted entirely electronically, a concept the futures market is
still struggling to appreciate.24 On August 22, 2001, the CFFC granted
"contract market designation" to the joint venture between Nasdaq and
(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC); see generally Single Stock Futures, supra
note 222.
245. Allison, supra note 56; see also Nasdaq Press Release, supra note 56.
246. Workshop on Operations, supra note 142, at 8, 11-13.
247. Nikki Tait, Americans Poised to be Offered Contracts: Single Stock Futures, FIN.
TIMES (LONDON), June 21, 2001, at 3.
24& Id.; Allison, supra note 56. Trading in this new market will be accessed via an
electronic medium. Id.
249. Tait, supra note 247, at 3.
250. LIFFE was established in 1982 and is "one of the leading markets for exchange-
traded derivatives." Nasdaq Press Release, supra note 56.
251. Id.
252- See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
253. Nasdaq Press Release, supra note 56.
254. See id.; see also Tait, supra note 247. Another aspect the futures market might be
struggling to appreciate is how to transact contracts in decimals, as mandated by the
CFMA. CFMA § 202(b)(2) (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1994)).
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LIFFE, the first such designation to be issued for a security futures
market25
World financial markets have increasingly become global entities.26
Trading will continue to expand not only across sectors and exchanges of
the United States, but cross-continental markets will grow as well.27 This
global economy, small-world approach will provide for stiffer
competition, enabling investors to reward innovation in products and
services. Increased connection between world markets should also
promote the development of an intermarket linkage system for security
futures, offering greater liquidity, less volatility, and enhanced
popularity, all contributing to the success of security futures products. 2 s
Once there are several markets on which to trade security futures,
success will depend on the creation of a national intermarket linkage
system.259 Such a system must allow security futures positions to be fully
fungible across multiple exchanges. 26 Full fungibility would allow
exchanges to battle each other over transactional benefits for investors,
thereby fostering a truly competitive market.26' Ultimately, linking
exchanges would provide a more liquid, less volatile, and more popular
method of trading security futures.262
The CFMA, however, does not permit an intermarket linkage system
until at least two years after security futures begin trading.263 If trading
volume fails to reach a certain level, the national market system cannot
255. CFTC Press Release 4559-01, CFTC Recognizes New Joint Venture Exchange for
Single-Stock Futures, Aug. 22,2001, at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press0l/opa4559-01.htm.
256. See, e.g., Nasdaq Press Release, supra note 56.
257. Id.
258. Workshop on Operations, supra note 142.
259. Id. In 1975, Congress recognized the importance of establishing a National
Market System in the securities markets by enacting 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000) (Section
IlA of the 1934 Act). A similar system is equally vital to the success of security futures
products. Id.
260. Workshop on Operations, supra note 142, at 8; see also Simons, supra note 91.
261. For example, the proposed margin rules would allow individual exchanges to
decide whether to allow a margin discount for certain hedged strategies such as synthetic
security futures. See supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text.
262. See Single Stock Futures, Remarks by CBOE Chairman and CEO, William J.
Brodsky to the Investment Analysts Society of Chicago (Mar. 1, 2001), at http://www.
single-stock-futures.com (discussing the importance of liquidity in the new security futures
market).
263. CEMA § 206(a)(7) (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(h)(7)(C)(1994)). The
provision specifically defers establishment of an intermarket linkage system until the later
of two years after security futures start trading, or six months after trading reaches a
volume of ten percent of the average volume of options on equities. Id.; see also Tait,
supra note 247.
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be established.264 The dilemma, therefore, is that if a lack of volume
prevents the establishment of a national market system, the volume will
likely never reach the requisite level.2a6 The problem is circular.
Specifically, initial unpopularity is likely to breed perpetual unpopularity.
The lack of an intermarket linkage system could restrict liquidity, making
it more difficult to find a buyer or seller for the product. Consequently,
the lack of liquidity would likely increase volatility and result in stricter
regulation and less retail interest in the product. Until options contracts
on security futures become legal to trade,26 which will introduce a whole
new array of issues, institutional trading will likely be lean as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. financial markets have undergone significant changes
over the last decade and will continue to evolve as investors look for new
opportunities to create wealth. Regulators must adapt to the rapidly
moving and continuously developing needs of investors in order to better
protect, stabilize, and reform the capital markets. They must do so,
however, without compromising legal predictability. Even if security
futures achieve wide-spread support and popularity, joint regulation by
the CFTC and the SEC creates more uncertainty than it resolves.
Ultimately, only time will tell the magnitude and the effects of this
uncertainty.
264. CFMA § 206(a)(7) (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(h)(7)(C)(1994)).
265. Id.
266. Options contracts on security futures are statutorily banned from trading until
December 2003. CFNA § 206(a)(6) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f(1994)).
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